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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the fair use doctrine, use of a copyrighted work is not an
infringement on a copyright if, after consideration of four factors, a court
considers the use to be fair.1 The four factors courts are required to consider
are: (1) “the purpose and character of the use;” (2) “the nature of the
copyrighted work;” (3) “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;” and (4) the effect the use has on
“the potential market for or value of the original copyrighted work.”2 A circuit
split exists between the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals
regarding the proper focus and application of the fair use factors in the context
of copyright litigation.3 The purpose of this Comment is to explain why it is
1.
2.
3.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Id.
Compare Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2014) (taking a
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improper to focus solely on “transformativeness,” and why courts must also
consider market effects when determining whether a secondary work is fair use
of a copyrighted work. For purposes of this Comment, the reader should
associate “transformativeness” with the first fair use factor, and associate
market effects with the fourth fair use factor.
Part II of this Comment discusses the origin of the circuit split between the
Second and Seventh Circuits. Part III explains how the “transformativeness”
analysis and market effect analysis are implicitly connected, which is one
reason it is not appropriate to focus solely on “transformativeness.” Part IV
explains how a market effects analysis helps maintain a balanced framework.
Finally, Part V proposes that a market-effects analysis limits frivolous
copyright infringement claims and promotes the progress of science and useful
technology.
II. HOW THE CIRCUIT SPLIT WAS CREATED: CAMPBELL, CARIOU, AND KIENITZ
In 1994, the United States Supreme Court issued the Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc.4 decision, which was the last time the Supreme Court provided
its insight regarding fair use in copyright law.5 In Campbell, the Court resolved
whether 2 Live Crew’s commercial parody of Roy Orbison’s copyrighted song,
“Oh, Pretty Woman,” was fair use within the meaning of the Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107.6 2 Live Crew’s manager contacted the copyright holder
of the song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” and expressed a willingness to pay a fee for
the band’s use of the song.7 The copyright holder refused permission.8 2 Live
Crew eventually released a parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” but still identified
the sources of “Pretty Woman” as Orbison and its publisher, Acuff-Rose.9
Although the use in Campbell was commercial, the Court found it to be fair
use through parody.10 The Court determined it was improper to hold the
commercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman” as being
“presumptively unfair.”11 It explained, “[n]o such evidentiary presumption is
available to address either the first factor, the character and purpose of the use,

more economic approach to determine fair use of copyrighted material), with Cariou v. Prince, 714
F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (focusing the fair use determination on whether a work is “transformative” of
the original copyrighted work).
4. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
5. See generally Id.
6. Id. at 571–72.
7. Id. at 572.
8. Id. at 572–73.
9. Id. at 573.
10. Id. at 574.
11. Id. at 594.
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or the fourth, market harm, in determining whether a “transformative use,” such
as parody, is a fair one.”12 The Court clearly kept the statutory fair use factors
separate from the notion of “transformative use,” but after the Campbell
decision was rendered, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals improperly began
treating “transformativeness” as the focus of the inquiry into fair use.13
As evidenced in Cariou v. Prince,14 the Second Circuit has essentially read
“transformativeness” into the list of four fair use factors.15 In Cariou, the court
determined certain appropriations of artwork to be considered fair use.16 An
artist appropriated thirty copyrighted photographs,17 and the court determined
twenty-five of the appropriated photographs to be fair use while the other five
photographs were remanded for determination consistent with the opinion.18 In
reaching this puzzling decision, the court seemingly imposed its own artistic
evaluation to determine whether the appropriated photographs were fair use of
the original photographs.19 This is no surprise, though, because in the context
of copyright litigation, courts too frequently impose their own interpretations
as evidence that cannot be reasonably doubted.20 Nonetheless, the court’s
decision certainly centered on the notion of “transformative use,” which the
court mistakenly believed to be the conclusion of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Campbell.21
Within the year following the Cariou decision, the Seventh Circuit issued
a decision in Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC,22 which brought attention to the

12. Id.
13. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Ringgold v. Black
Entm’t. Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d
109 (2d Cir. 1998); Castle Rock Entm’t., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
2010).
14. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
15. See id. at 705–06 (stating that the first statutory factor to consider, which is the heart of the
fair use inquiry, is whether and to what extent the new work is transformative).
16. Id. at 712.
17. Id. at 699.
18. Id. at 698–99, 712.
19. Id. at 707–08 (providing artistic analysis by looking at the artworks and photographs sideby-side, and concluding that the appropriated art images, for the most part, had a different character,
different expression, new aesthetics, among other things).
20. See, e.g., Wild v. NBC Universal, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding
lack of similarity between contents of a television show and a three-book series); Davis v. Am. Broad.
Cos., No. 1:10-CV-167, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76145 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (granting motion to dismiss
after taking judicial notice of the “generic elements of creative works”).
21. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706–07 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994)).
22. 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
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problems posed by focusing the fair use analysis on “transformative use.”23 In
Kienitz, the court determined certain t-shirts, which displayed an appropriated
version of a copyrighted photograph, to be fair use of the copyrighted
photograph.24 Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the parties in Kienitz
debated whether the t-shirts were a “transformative use” of certain copyrighted
photos and, if so, just how “transformative” the use was required to be.25 The
Seventh Circuit immediately pointed out that “transformative use” was not one
of the statutory fair use factors even though the Supreme Court discussed it in
Campbell.26 It further explained that the Second Circuit had run away with the
Supreme Court’s suggestion and erroneously concluded that “transformative
use” is enough to bring a modified copy of a copyrighted work within the scope
of the fair use defense.27
In particular, Kienitz expressed skepticism with the Cariou approach
because exclusively asking whether something is “transformative” would
replace the four statutory fair use factors,28 and could also override the
protection for derivative works that is afforded under 17 U.S.C. §106(2).29
Ultimately, the Kienitz court found it best to stick with the statutory list of fair
use factors, of which the most important was deemed to be the fourth (market
effect) factor.30 Regarding market effect, the court asked whether the secondary
use of the copyrighted photographs was a “complement to the protected work
rather than a substitute for it.”31 It determined the t-shirts were no substitute
for the original photograph because there was no evidence the t-shirts reduced
the demand for the original photograph or any additional use of the photograph
the copyright-owner contemplated.32
It is the perfect time for the United States Supreme Court to clarify the
appropriate assessment to evaluate the four statutory fair use factors by
resolving the circuit split between the Second and Seventh Circuits.33

23. Id.
24. See id. at 757, 760.
25. Id. at 758.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (explaining that by saying a new use “transforms” a copyrighted work is precisely to
say that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under § 106(2)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 759.
33. Andrea W. Jeffries, High Court Will Need to Resolve Circuit Split in Fair Use, LAW360
(Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/645919/high-court-will-need-to-resolve-circuitsplit-in-fair-use [http://perma.cc/NEB2-83BL] (discussing the need for the United States Supreme
Court to resolve the circuit split on the application of the fair use factors).
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied a petition to resolve the circuit split
on March 23, 2015.34
III. ANALYSES OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH FAIR USE FACTORS ARE
IMPLICITLY CONNECTED, SO IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO FOCUS SOLELY ON
TRANSFORMATIVENESS
The market-effect analysis of the fair use factors implicitly resolves the
“transformative use” analysis because, under the fair use statute,35 the
consideration of the fourth factor is substantively connected to the
consideration of the first factor. The Campbell decision, which is considered
the seminal Supreme Court case regarding the fair use factors, should be seen
as opening the door to the analytical framework regarding market effects on
fair use.36 However, as Jeanne C. Fromer articulates in Market Effects Bearing
on Fair Use, the Court in Campbell obfuscated this [market-effects] framework
by not underscoring the importance of the fourth fair use factor, which has
meant that courts continue to offer varying analyses of the fourth factor.37 The
Cariou decision further buries the importance of the market-effects factor by
focusing too narrowly on the “transformative” language introduced in
Campbell.38 In other words, the Cariou court essentially just took Campbell’s
instructive language and read it into the first factor of 17 U.S.C. § 107.39
When the Kienitz decision was rendered, it received unmerited criticisms40
because of the misunderstandings surrounding the Campbell and Cariou
decisions, which were believed to endorse the first factor analytic framework
in its focus on “transformative use.”41 However, such belief is misplaced
because the Campbell decision did not actually endorse the “transformative
use” framework.42 Interestingly enough, the Campbell decision actually links
34. Id. at 2.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
36. Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 617 (2015)
(discussing how the Campbell decision “opened the door to a laudable analytical framework for the
bearing of market effects on fair use.”).
37. Id.
38. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2013).(declaring the “transformative
use” inquiry to be the heart of the fair use inquiry).
39. The first factor regards the purpose and character of a use, but does not include language
regarding the transformative nature of that use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
40. See Jeffries, supra note 33 (alleging the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not fully
understand the nuances to fair use law, and found its criticism of the transformative use framework to
be misplaced).
41. See Jeffries, supra note 33; Fromer, supra note 36.
42. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 , 578–85, 590 (1994) (discussing,
in its first factor analysis, commercial character of the use, and continuing such discussion in its fourth
factor analysis, regarding market effects).
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the transformative nature of a use with the degree to which the market is
affected, and it does so by discussing the notion of market substitution.43 For
instance, when a commercial use amounts to a mere duplication of the entirety
of an original, it clearly supersedes the original and serves as a market
replacement for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original
will occur.44 Conversely, if the commercial use amounts to a “transformative
use” of an original work, market substitution is less certain, and market harm
under the fourth fair use factor may not be so readily inferred.45 Therefore, the
Campbell opinion actually indicates that determining whether a use of
copyrighted material is transformative requires consideration of market
effect.46
The Cariou opinion from the Second Circuit largely ignored the substantive
connection between the first and fourth fair use factors by making the
“transformative use” inquiry the focus of its analysis.47 In Cariou, the court
essentially read the “transformative use” analytic framework into the list of
factors in 17 U.S.C. § 107 by asking exclusively whether something is
transformative.48 Regarding the first factor, the court held that a use is
transformative if a new work alters the original work with new expression,
meaning, or message.49 The court cited Campbell for this proposition, but as
indicated previously, the Campbell court was not expressly endorsing the
transformative analytic framework utilized in Cariou.50 Furthermore, the
Cariou court’s definition of “transformative” does not include the consideration
of the market substitution effect that was discussed in Campbell.51 Importantly,
the Supreme Court also stated that analyzing “transformative use” is not
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use,52 which undermines the notion in
Cariou that the “transformative use” inquiry is at the heart of the fair use
inquiry.53

43. Id. at 591.
44. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013).
48. Kienitz, 755 F.3d at 758.
49. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
50. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
51. See id at 578–79, 591 (discussing whether a new work merely supersedes the objects of the
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose of different character, thereby
altering the first creation with new expression, meaning, or message.)
52. Id. at 579.
53. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705–06.
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The Kienitz decision emerged from the Seventh Circuit in 2014, shortly
after the Cariou opinion, and seemingly sought to get the fair use jurisprudence
back on track.54 The court’s opinion declared that “transformative use” is not
one of the statutory fair use factors, even though the Supreme Court mentioned
it in Campbell.55 Furthermore, the court made clear that it was sticking to the
statutory list, of which the most important factor is the fourth factor, which
concerns market effects.56 Essentially, then, the Kienitz opinion implicitly
suggests that Cariou wrongly interpreted Campbell, and the central focus of the
fair use analysis should be on the fourth factor, which focuses on market
effect.”57
The Kienitz court then followed Campbell’s market-effect analysis and
determined if there were any cognizable market effects, which is best evidenced
by determining whether a contested use is a complement to the protected work
rather than a substitute for it.58 The Kienitz opinion correctly understood the
Campbell holding as indicating the “transformative use” inquiry as being an aid
in resolving the ultimate, and most important inquiry in fair use disputes:
whether the copyright owner’s market or value will be affected by the
secondary use.59 “Transformative use” is merely an aid because, as stated
previously, it is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use,60 and the
transformative nature of a work or use is logically contingent upon the degree
of harm caused to the copyright owner’s market.61 Therefore, adopting an
analytic framework to the statutory fair use factors focused on “transformative
use” would ignore Supreme Court precedent62 and ignore the fact that the
market-effects framework promulgated in Kienitz already includes
considerations of “transformativeness.”63

54. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, 755 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (criticizing the Second
Circuit’s focus on “transformative use” while reaffirming the most important statutory factor under 17
U.S.C. § 107 to be the fourth factor concerning market effect(s)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. (asking whether the contested use is a complement for the protected work (allowed)
rather than a substitute for it (prohibited)) (citing Ty, Inc. v. Publ’n. Int’l. Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir.
2002); and Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003)).
59. See id. at 758–59 (rejecting the notion that “transformative use” is a required consideration
in and of itself, but rather, it is merely an aid in the ultimate inquiry into market effects).
60. Id.
61. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
62. See id. at 590.
63. See id. at 591.
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IV. FOCUSING ON MARKET EFFECT(S) ALLOWS A MORE OBJECTIVE METHOD
TO ASSESS FAIR USE, WHICH WILL BALANCE OUT THE SUBJECTIVITY
IMPOSED BY JUDGES THAT FOCUS SOLELY ON TRANSFORMATIVENESS
The Second Circuit’s discussion of “transformativeness” in Cariou
illustrates the primary problem posed by focusing fair use analysis on
“transformativeness.” As stated before, in Cariou, the court was tasked with
determining whether the secondary use of thirty, copyrighted photographs was
fair use of the originals.64 Twenty-five appropriated photographs to be fair use
of certain copyrighted photographs because the secondary works were
transformative.65 However, the court arbitrarily determined five appropriated
photographs as not being transformative.66 This odd decision was the result of
the court’s arbitrary and subjective side-by-side comparison of each original
photograph with each appropriated, secondary photograph.67
The “side-by-side” method of analysis led the Cariou majority to determine
that the secondary use of the copyrighted photographs was transformative and,
thus, fair use.68 In other words, the fair use analysis in Cariou was simply an
imposition of the court’s own artistic judgment.69 This should be no surprise,
though, because in the context of copyright litigation, courts too frequently
impose their own artistic interpretations when resolving fair use disputes.70
Allowing such an approach would result in inconsistent results for fair use
disputes because the dispositive factor in the fair use analysis would be the
subjective opinions of the judges.
The market-effects framework discussed in Kienitz is more objective than
the “transformative use” framework because it aims to objectively determine
whether the secondary use of original copyrighted work operates as a substitute

64. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698–704 (2d Cir. 2013).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 707–08, 710–11.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 713–14 (explaining the court’s subjective artistic judgment as its basis for finding the
secondary works to be transformative of the original, copyrighted photographs) (Wallace, J.,
dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Wild v. NBC Universal, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding
lack of similarity between contents of a television show and a three-book series based on the court’s
subjective opinion); Davis v. Am. Broad. Cos., No. 1:10-CV-167, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76145 (W.D.
Mich. 2010) (granting motion to dismiss after taking judicial notice of the “generic elements” of
creative works).
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for or a complement to the original.71 Under the market-effects framework
discussed in Kienitz, the question of “transformativeness” is secondary to the
question of market effect.72 After determining if, how, and to what extent a
copyrighted works’ market is affected, the court may then ask whether the
secondary use is a “transformative use.”73 This allows for a whole-bodied
approach to fair use law, which will also afford more predictability in how the
fair use doctrine is applied to these kinds of disputes.74 Such an approach will
not only promote a clearer and more predictable fair use doctrine, it will also
promote the progress of science and useful technology.
V. THE KIENITZ MARKET-EFFECT FRAMEWORK BEST PROMOTES THE
PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL TECHNOLOGY, WHICH IS IMPORTANT IN
MODERN SOCIETY
The most important reason the market-effects approach should be the
standard for resolving fair use disputes is because it upholds the purpose of
copyright law, which is “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts.”75
As Justice Story once explained, “[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art,
there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly
new and original throughout.”76 If this were true, it would be counterintuitive
to adopt a standard that allows fair use disputes to be resolved by the
unpredictable and subjective opinions of judges regarding whether something
is new and original enough to be considered transformative, thereby making it
a fair use of copyrighted work.77 As the dissent in Cariou makes clear, by
focusing solely on the “transformativeness” of a secondary use of copyrighted
material, the majority is truly making a determination based on its own artistic
judgment.78 The problem with this kind of subjective judgment is illustrated
by examining the way modern technology has blurred the line regarding works
that may be transformed in the traditional sense.79
71. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
72. Id. at 758–59.
73. Id.
74. See Zahr K. Said, Foreword: Fair Use in the Digital Age, and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose at
21, 90 WASH. L. REV. 579, 591–92 (2015) (asserting that the full-bodied approach to analyzing harm
to the plaintiff’s market should be reintroduced to the fair use analysis).
75. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (citing U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
76. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (citing Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD
Mass. 1845)).
77. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712–14 (holding that twenty-five out of the thirty pieces of
appropriated artworks were considered to be fair use) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 713.
79. See Edward J. Black, Better Understanding of Fair Use, Tech Missing from Copyright
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Economic consultants have urged that, “[i]n difficult economic times, we
need to preserve and promote America’s engines of innovation . . . ,” which
means avoiding a fair use standard that is “likely to deter significant
technological innovation at a time when technology innovators are leading the
effort to add new, high-paying jobs to our economy.”80 If courts follow the
Cariou decision and focus on determining the extent to which the use of a
copyrighted work is transformative, the economic benefits that are supposed to
be permitted by the fair use doctrine will certainly be hindered.81 The marketeffects framework utilized in Kienitz is more effective than the “transformative
use” framework because it limits the amount of trivial claims that can be
brought under copyright law.82 More importantly, the market-effects
framework allows “fair use industries” to generate economic growth.83
Examples of “fair use industries” include manufacturers of consumer
devices that allow individual copying of copyrighted programming, educational
institutions, software developers, and Internet search and web hosting
providers.84 Fair use industries “have grown dramatically within the past” two
decades, and the growth of these industries “has had a profound impact on the
U.S. economy.”85 The Computer & Communications Industry Association
(CCIA) conducted an economic study regarding the national recession in 2008
and 2009, which indicated fair use industries were still successful during a
period of incredible economic struggle.86 During the recession, fair use
Hearing, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-jblack/better-understanding-of-fair-use_b_4675624.html [https://perma.cc/MN7F-R5LR] (explaining
how the fair use doctrine has proven to be the only way to keep up with developing technology in light
of our nation’s outdated copyright law).
80. See THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY:
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 2 (2011), http://cdn.ccianet.org/
wp-content/uploads/library/CCIA-FairUseintheUSEconomy-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3RX2-54L2].
81. See id. at 5 (stating that “the fair use doctrine . . . [has] grown in importance with the rise
of the digital economy, as fair use permits a range of activities that are critical to many high technology
businesses and are an important foundation of the Internet economy).
82. See Black, supra note 79 (“[I]t should go without saying that a principle that prevents
lawsuits over nine-word quotes, seven-second clips and fleeting glimpses of team logos should figure
prominently in the conversation [about modernizing our nation’s copyright law], particularly when
[the fair use doctrine] is also a cornerstone of modern Internet law”).
83. See ROGERS & SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 80, at 5 (explaining that “[t]he ubiquity of the
Internet means that the economic growth fostered by fair use is widespread and generates significant
consumer benefits”).
84. Id. at 6 (defining “fair use industries” as “industries . . . that depend upon fair
use . . . exceptions”).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 4 (pointing out that, “notwithstanding [the] recessionary [economic] environment,
the fair use economy remained steady when measured by value added, while the remainder of the U.S.
economy contracted”).
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industries had economic growth in five areas: national revenue, contribution to
the national GDP, national employment rates, employee productivity, and
national exports of goods and services.87 The CCIA study also indicates that
the growth rate of fair use industries has outpaced overall economic growth in
recent years, fueled productivity gains, and supported millions of jobs.88
In the modern digital age, people use, reinterpret, and remix copyrighted
content to develop new technologies like Internet search engines and social
network sites.89 The role of the public user has expanded in the digital age, and
there is access to free-flowing information at all times via the Internet.90 In
light of how the Internet and other technology has developed in recent decades,
it makes sense to utilize the market-effect approach promulgated in Kienitz and
determine whether a contested use is a complement to, or a market substitute
for a protected work.91 Focusing on this inquiry allows economic benefits and
harms to be considered in determining whether a contested use is a fair use.92
Focusing the inquiry in this manner affords a balanced approach to fair use law,
which is the proper approach for courts to use in the digital age.
VI. CONCLUSION
The disagreement regarding the proper framework to utilize in assessing
fair use of copyrighted work should be resolved in favor of a market-effects
analysis, with a “transformativeness” framework as a secondary inquiry into
fair use. First, as indicated in Part III, the market-effect approach implicitly
involves considerations of “transformative use” because the market-effect
approach requires courts to determine whether a use of copyrighted work
operates as a market complement or market substitute. So, concerns of ignoring
the extent to which a use of copyrighted work is transformative are unfounded.
Second, as indicated in Part IV, the market-effect framework is a balanced,
whole-bodied approach to resolving fair use disputes. Utilizing the

87. Id. at 6–7.
88. Id. at 7.
89. Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 50 (2012) (discussing how the fair
use doctrine plays a pivotal role in allowing technological progress).
90. Cynthia M. Cimino, Fair Use in the Digital Age: Are We Playing Fair?, 4 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 203, 220–21 (2002) (discussing how judicial decisions have shifted the fair use
inquiry from its traditional focus on whether or not a substantial amount of the protected work was
taken, to no focusing on a market-driven analysis).
91. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that,
under the market-effect theory, a complementary use is permissible fair use, but a use that is a market
substitute for the protected work is not allowed).
92. See Said, supra note 74, at 591–92 (citing Professor Jeanne C. Fromer for the proposition
that “Campbell can be read to require consideration of all of the market effects on a plaintiff’s work,
not just the negative ones . . . .”).
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“transformative use” framework from Cariou instead of the market effect(s)
framework from Kienitz will only continue to allow courts to impose their own
subjective artistic opinions regarding “transformativeness” and will continue to
produce inconsistent and unpredictable fair use decisions. Third, as indicated
in Part V, the market-effect framework best promotes the progress of science
and useful technology by acknowledging the reality that the modern digital age
has changed the way business is conducted and the amount of access the public
has to copyrighted works.
In light of these foregoing reasons, it should be clear that the fair use
doctrine is an economic doctrine more than anything else. Accordingly, the
proper framework for assessing fair use is to first assess market effect(s), if any,
and then to assess “transformativeness” as a second measure.
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